the future operating environment. This complex strategic environment, like the world around us, is changing at an exponential rate, and, in arguably unpredictable directions.
Thus, the challenges of educating future landpower leaders are also changing. Key concepts like Fourth Generation Warfare and Hybrid War are changing how we think about the future of war. The current Army Education System was designed to develop large numbers of leaders educated in linear warfare and has not kept pace with a transforming Army. Tomorrow's landpower leaders must not only be educated to be masters of the tactical domain, but must master soft-power attributes such as governance, cross-cultural awareness, and inter-agency and interpersonal dynamics.
The future landpower leaders must have a thorough understanding of "how to think" and this competency must be introduced at a much earlier point in an officer's career in order to begin reshaping our educational institutions to address the uncertain security environment.
EDUCATING FOR LANDPOWER
The real conquests, the only ones that do not cause regret, are those that are won over ignorance.
-Napoleon Bonaparte with law enforcement; and assisting Iraqi leaders with social projects designed to reinvigorate trust in the local government. As much as Ray was unprepared for some of these tasks he was more concerned with the readiness of his subordinate commanders to deal with the myriad of "non-traditional" stability and support tasks confronting them on a daily basis. The subordinate leaders simply did not have the right tools in their kitbags to socially interact with such a diverse culture using mature interpersonal skills.
Ray's battalion received all of the pre-deployment cultural briefings but readily admits that much of the information did little to prepare the battalion's leaders for what they faced in 2007.
Is the Army's Education System adapting to the current operating environment?
Is there enough rigor and reflective thought in the process to capture lessons learned and quickly turn that knowledge into systems and processes designed to prepare our landpower leaders? How is the Army adapting our educational processes to prepare our landpower leaders of tomorrow who will most certainly be faced with adversaries of increasing complexity and operating in a very uncertain environment? What will the future security environment look like? What skills, competencies, attributes, and background should future leaders possess in order to be successful?
The Future Strategic Environment
There is no shortage of academic and non-academic material available purporting to describe, predict, or forecast the future security environment that United
States military and civilian leaders will find themselves operating in over the next 15 to 20 years. Numerous scholars, former and current military leaders, war and conflict theorists, and the occasional arm-chair quarterback have all opined what the future security environment will look like. Only by reading and critically examining the various works can military and civilian trainers and educators begin to prepare our future military and civilian leaders for the future. The focus should not necessarily be on the predictions, but on teaching the mental agility to understand the immediate operating environment. Although focused on future military landpower leaders, many of the ideas and concepts are directly applicable to all military leaders as well as civilian counterparts working in the national security arena. The theories and forecasts of the future security environment described below provides context as educators explore how the military must begin thinking about the educational requirements of future military landpower leaders.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry K. Shelton, described several factors, linked to probable threats, that will affect the changing nature of the future security environment.
3 General Shelton highlighted a much shortened strategic response time that characterizes United States military action, an increased number of failed states featuring people struggling for independence and political legitimacy, the proliferation of technologies available to potential adversaries, and the growing range and types of conflicts characterized by asymmetric attacks, anti-access strategies, and information warfare designed to counter our strengths and prevent United States forces from deploying. 4 It is easy to argue that General Shelton's ideas are happening now and nothing new but, the speed and complexities of the factors he describes are growing exponentially and show no signs of tapering. The key point is to critically examine how the Officer Education System (OES) is keeping pace with the changes to the operating environment and by exploring how the education process is adapting to educate the future military landpower leaders to deal with the complexities of the changing security environment. states, and the rapid diffusion of knowledge and technology. 6 The adversary operating in this type of environment will be much more savvy of United States intent and capabilities and will seek to negate or bypass our strengths. In addition, the authors contend that adversaries with greater access to WMD, funding, and situational awareness will be unconstrained by norms, rules, and laws that will serve to further complicate the environment by seeking victory by avoiding defeat and operating within population centers. 7 While these ideas and concepts don't put forth a new paradigm, the increasing complexity and the increasing number of practitioners of this type of warfare are quickly becoming the norm rather than the exception. The key aspect put forth in the article is that superior political will, if employed properly, can and will overcome greater economic and military power. landpower professionals of the future will also be operating on a fourth block; a block characterized by information warfare that is embedded in the three previously mentioned blocks. 22 Everything that a soldier does or fails to do is sending a message that could completely change the operating environment in which the force is operating.
Today's landpower professionals do receive fundamental training in information operations but are we educating our officers to be intellectually agile or just training them to employ the technological aspects?
Another key aspect of hybrid war, and arguably all irregular war, is the simple fact that the adversary focuses on the human terrain to identify success or failure.
Examples abound in Iraq and Afghanistan where United States or coalition forces successfully defeat the adversary's forces only to lose the strategic battle to protect or secure the population. Hybrid war is not a new phenomenon. Many theorists contend that hybrid war is just an evolution of a learning enemy who understands the complex nature of the environment and changes tactics to offset our advantages on the battlefield.
The future operating environment, as described by noted theorists and military professionals, will likely only increase in complexity as adversaries learn from past mistakes and alter their tactics. From failed states to ideological terrorists to the superempowered individual, tomorrow's landpower professionals must be educated in a manner that prepares them to understand the nature of the fight and provide them the intellectual agility and critical thinking skills required to deal with a very uncertain environment. The theme running through all of the predictions is that tomorrow's landpower leaders must be adaptable, employ critical thinking skills, use interpersonal skills to address the human terrain, and display cultural understanding to deal with a very uncertain environment. Tomorrow's officers deserve an educational system that is built upon lessons learned and one that provides an atmosphere, both formal and informal, where they are exposed to different schools of thought. In addition, the education system must expand to incorporate non-conventional competencies such as governance and diplomacy at an earlier stage in the officers' career to prepare them for the environment in which they will operate.
Many officers will argue that the proverbial "rucksack" is already filled to the top and that adding additional tasks will overwhelm the more junior officers. Some of the skills not immediately relevant could be deferred in favor of essential skills already identified as critical in the future operating environment. Today's junior officers are ready to learn and understand the ever changing operational environment -they are products of that environment. Investment in higher level cognitive abilities will pay dividends earlier in an officer's career. By educating officers to understand and acknowledge uncertain or ambiguous situations while in a non-combat environment the officer is more likely to make a decision rather than be paralyzed into inaction out of fear of the unknown.
It is important to note that as an institution, the United States Army, and military as a whole, is universally recognized for producing very talented and decisive leaders.
That fact is not in question. What is in question is whether or not the education system, that has served the military so well in a linear combat environment, can be changed or adapted to work just as well in the current and future complex operating environment.
The Army Training System
The Army Training System (ATS) comprises both training and education and serves to synchronize the three training domains referred to as the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. 23 Training prepares individuals for certainty while education prepares individuals for uncertainty and enables agility, judgment, and creativity. Army Field Manual 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations, offers a very useful definition of the two terms. 24 Interestingly enough, the two terms are often used interchangeably when, in fact, the two have very distinct applications within the Army Training System. Training prepares individuals and organizations by developing the skills, functions and teamwork necessary to accomplish a task or mission successfully.
Training is generally associated with "what to do" and often includes repetitive tasks.
Education, in contrast, provides intellectual constructs and principles and allows leaders to apply knowledge and solve problems under uncertain or ambiguous conditions.
Education is generally associated with "how to think" and how to solve problems that may not have any one right answer.
Within the three training-domain framework, Army officers can expect to be The Officer Education System (OES), a subset of the Army Training System, has the goal of producing officers that are fully competent in their core warfighting skills;
understand how the Army fits into the joint and multi-national environment; demonstrate identified competencies and attributes; use critical judgment and reasoning; display adaptability and versatility; and can operate in an environment of complexity and ambiguity. 25 The framework of the Officer Education System has evolved little over the past decade and has not kept pace with a transforming Army. attempts to capture how, as an officers career evolves, the need for increased educational opportunities take precedence over training. 27 Early in an officer's career training is paramount as the new leader adjusts to the military, inculcates the warrior ethos, and prepares for the first unit of assignment. Over time, the sliding scale shifts from a focus on training for certainty to educating for uncertainty. Under the current
Officer Education System the shift from training to education supposedly takes place at the Captain's Career Course where officers are exposed to the concepts of critical thinking and how to think. In reality, the shift normally takes place during attendance at the Intermediate Level Education. Many argue that the sliding scale is no longer a useful tool; the ever changing security environment has blurred the distinction and new tools may be needed.
Today's current Officer Education System has not adapted over time to keep pace with transformation and remains firmly rooted in a cold war mentality that visualizes the operating environment through the lens of the tactical, operational, and strategic-levels of war. In addition, the system is based on several false assumptions that must be addressed. One, officers will not serve in positions forcing them to make decisions or provide advice at a level they had not yet been schooled for; two, future training and experiences an officer receives "on the job" will adequately prepare the officer for advancement and additional schooling; and three, officers are inherently self- and rarely seek knowledge on their own. 28 The Army has recently introduced critical thinking skills into "school-house" curriculum, a step in the right direction, but the education process, as a whole, still fails to address the critical skills of cultural understanding, educating for adaptability, and educating officers with interpersonal skills required to operate in the human terrain. Building Cultural Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations, focused on identifying the critical components of cultural training required for the Army Education System. 37 In the study, primary author, Allison Abbe, writes that building a cultural capability includes three interrelated components, including knowledge of the specific region or culture, proficiency in the spoken language, and general knowledge and skills that support adaption in any cross-cultural setting. 38 It is not enough to simply study a region; to be successful in future conflicts we must build a cadre of landpower professions that understand the culture and have what is called perceptual acuity -the ability to observe and interpret cultural information encountered through one's own experiences. 39 The term mirror-imaging, when used in the context of describing culture, usually means that an individual mentally reacts to an uncertain event by falling back on their own core values and thus interpreting an event through that lens. Recent United States military operations in vastly different cultures clearly indicate that mirror imaging is not only dangerous but usually completely wrong. Cultural understanding, as opposed to knowledge, is important when considering the impact that operations will have on the local population. General Anthony Zinni once wrote, "Know the culture and the issues.
Educating Landpower Professionals
We must know who the decision makers are. We must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture." 40 In addition, the increasing number of stability and support operations will force landpower professionals to not only have a greater degree of cultural understanding but a greater ability to use skills rarely taught in today's military institutions. Those attributes include negotiation and mediation skills, the ability to visualize second and third order effects, and basic interpersonal skills. One surprising outcome from the ARI research indicates that while rudimentary language skills often convey respect to the local populace, effective interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity contribute more to successful intercultural outcomes than language proficiency should be maximized to allow officers to remain in the operating force while participating in self-development. An officer's self-development plan should become as important as the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and leaders should be held accountable for mentoring and monitoring a subordinate's self-development plan.
We must break the cultural barrier by rewarding assignments to critical enablers like the Department of State, Department of Commerce, or United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The PME institutions must be the genesis for this cultural change. The faculty and students of the professional military education institutions should reflect the diversity of the operational environment which they will return to; all organizations of the United States Government should be represented.
With the ever increasing use of the military for stability and support operations, Secretary Gates' statement in Joint Force Quarterly that "from the standpoint of America's national security, the most important assignment in your military career may not be commanding United States Soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nations as they battle the forces of terror and instability within their own border" 48 should be a warning call to all personnel managers that the command track is not the only track to success. The Army personnel assignment process must change to reflect the changing realities of success.
Lastly, the importance of education and preparing tomorrow's landpower professionals cannot be understated. It is from within the professional military education institutions that cultural change will take root that will enable a true transformation of the landpower forces. Educators must be prepared to critically look at how we educate our future leaders and critically evaluate the underlying assumptions behind the current Officer Education System. OES is not changing fast enough to keep pace with the changing operating environment and the need for officers skilled not only with core warfighting skills outlined in Field Manual 6-22, "Army Leadership", but in the nuanced attributes and competencies of soft-power. Changing our education system is not necessarily about introducing new innovations but about having the mental agility and forethought to know when to innovate in order to reduce the cycle. As BG Fastabend states, innovative organizations depend less on forecasting, planning, and control and more on scanning, agility, and feedback. 49 To remain relevant, the Army
Officer Education System must focus on the key attributes of cultural understanding, mental adaptability, critical thinking, and interpersonal skills to educate the landpower leaders of tomorrow. We can no longer afford to wait until an officer reaches the Senior Service Colleges to build officers that are mentally agile and ready to proactively respond to future threats. Tomorrow's threat, in whatever form it takes, will not wait until our education system begins turning out our critically thinking leaders before they take advantage of our vulnerability. Only landpower forces provide the capability to control and dominate the land environment. The Army requires officers who are not only mentally agile but educated to think critically and creatively.
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